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Main points
•	 For	 almost	 a	hundred	years	 (since	World	War	 I	 and	 the	dis-
integration	of	the	Ottoman	Empire)	stability	–	or	rather,	 the	
permanent	 threat	 to	stability	–	has	been	a	key	challenge	 for	
the	Middle	East.	One	of	the	central	elements	of	this	threat	has	
been	 the	 so-called	 Kurdish	 problem,	 that	 is,	 the	 issues	 that	
continually	 arise	 between	 the	 states	 of	 the	 region	 and	 the	
Kurdish	minority	 living	 in	 the	 area,	 as	well	 as	 the	 tensions	
among	the	individual	states	caused	by	a	range	of	issues	related	
to	local	Kurds.	The	country	most	affected	by	the	Kurdish	prob-
lem	is	Turkey.	
•	 The	 last	 decade	 has	 been	 a	 period	 of	 deep	 tensions	 and	 re-
-evaluations	 across	 the	Middle	 East,	 with	 both	 domestic	 as	
well	as	wider,	geopolitical	ramifications.	This,	in	turn,	has	led	
to	a	rapid	erosion	of	the	regional	order	that	until	now	had	en-
sured	at	 least	 some	degree	of	 stability.	The	Arab	Spring	and	
the	civil	war	in	Syria	(since	2011)	are	the	two	most	striking	ex-
amples	of	the	changing	reality.	The	return	of	the	old	political	
order	across	the	Middle	East	appears	rather	unlikely.	
•	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Arab	 Spring,	 little	 attention	 has	 been	
paid	 to	 the	changes	undertaken	by	both	 the	Kurds	and	Tur-
key.	In	both	cases	the	past	decade	has	ushered	in	significant	
internal	 transformations,	 and	 in	 both	 cases	 these	 changes	
have	reflected	the	broader	processes	occurring	in	the	region.	
What	is	more,	in	both	cases	these	transformations	have	been	
an	important	factor	driving	fundamental	changes	across	the	
Middle	East.	
•	 At	the	end	of	2012,	the	Kurdish	people	(regardless	of	their	in-
ternal	heterogeneity)	are	the	strongest	they	have	been	in	their	
recent	 history:	 they	 have	managed	 to	 take	 effective	 control	
over	the	areas	they	inhabit	 in	Iraq	and	Syria,	and	they	have	
obtained	 significant	 political	 and	military	 power	 in	 Turkey.	
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Consequently,	the	Kurdish	people	are	no	longer	perceived	only	
as	an	object	and	a	tool	in	the	Middle	Eastern	politics,	but	are	
increasingly	being	 seen	as	 an	 independent	 entity	 on	 the	 re-
gion’s	political	scene.	
•	 The	 changes	witnessed	 in	 Turkey	 over	 the	 last	 decade	 have	
had	an	even	greater	 impact	on	 the	region:	namely,	Ankara’s	
evolutionary	but	consistent	process	of	re-modelling	the	state	
and	its	foreign	policy,	including	Turkey’s	growing	engagement	
in	the	Middle	East,	with	the	hope	of	securing	the	position	of	
the	region’s	 leader.	Consequently,	Turkey	has	adopted	a	new	
approach	to	the	Kurdish	issue:	domestically,	by	liberalising	its	
previously	uncompromising	position	on	 the	Kurdish	minor-
ity,	and	in	its	foreign	policy,	by	identifying	the	(Iraqi)	Kurds	as	
one	of	Ankara’s	key	partners	in	regional	politics.		
•	 The	process	of	the	empowerment	of	the	Kurdish	people	is	not	
complete	yet,	and	 its	outcome	cannot	be	guaranteed.	At	 this	
stage,	 Turkey’s	 position	 on	 its	 own	Kurdish	minority	 leaves	
much	to	be	desired,	while	Ankara’s	achievements	in	its	Middle	
East	policy	remain	debatable.	Moreover,	Turkey’s	spectacular	
progress	in	its	relations	with	the	Iraqi	Kurds	has	been	tinted	
by	new	threats,	including	those	generated	by	the	Kurds	them-
selves.	The	Kurdish	minority	and	the	Turkish	state	are	both	
subject	to	and	the	main	causes	of	regional	tensions	which	are	
dynamic,	turbulent	and	difficult	to	resolve	–	a	state	of	affairs	
which	is	likely	to	continue	well	into	the	future.	In	view	of	the	
scale	of	the	challenges	faced	by	Turkey,	a	solution	to	the	Kurd-
ish	problem	is	not	only	a	condition	for	realising	Ankara’s	re-
gional	ambitions,	but	also	for	ensuring	the	country’s	internal	
stability	and	 the	nature	of	 the	 transformations.	And	 for	 the	
Kurds,	 good	 relations	with	Turkey	are	necessary	 if	 they	are	
to	maintain	and	strengthen	their	existing	accomplishments.	
Past	experience	shows,	however,	that	although	this	will	not	be	
a	quick	and	easy	process,	a	positive	outcome	is	not	impossible.	
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the Kurdish probleM. introduction 
The	Kurdish	problem	–	 i.e.,	 the	 deep	 and	 on-going	 tensions	 be-
tween	Kurds	 and	 the	 countries	 in	which	 the	 Kurdish	minority	
lives	(Turkey,	Iraq,	Iran,	Syria)	–	has	over	the	last	century	become	
permanently	 inscribed	 in	 the	political	 specificity	 of	 the	Middle	
East1.	To	a	greater	or	 lesser	degree,	 the	Kurds	are	actively	seek-
ing	to	expand	their	political	powers,	including	calls	for	independ-
ence.	 In	 order	 to	protect	 their	 territorial	 integrity	 and	 internal	
cohesion,	the	countries	in	the	region	have	treated	Kurdish	aspira-
tions	as	a	threat,	and	have	therefore	actively	opposed	them.	
box 1. Kurdistan 
A	geo-cultural	region	inhabited,	now	or	in	the	past,	by	the	
Kurdish	people,	who	constitute	the	region’s	dominant	ethnic	
group.	It	includes	the	eastern	areas	of	Turkey,	northern	Iraq,	
western	Iran	and	northern	parts	of	Syria.	Depending	on	the	
methodology,	Kurdistan’s	area	has	been	estimated	at	between	
200,000	km2	and	530,000	km2.	Despite	the	Kurds’	rich	his-
tory	and	cultural	identity,	‘Kurdistan’	has	never	existed	as	
a	separate	state;	until	the	twentieth	century,	one	could	speak	
of	semi-autonomous	Kurdish	principalities	located	within	the	
Ottoman	and	Persian	empires,	and	later	the	Kurdish	autono-
mies	within	Iraq.	Provinces	named	Kurdistan	currently	exist	
in	both	Iraq	and	Iran,	although	these	do	not	cover	all	the	ar-
eas	inhabited	by	the	Kurds.	In	Turkey,	meanwhile,	the	use	of	
the	name	Kurdistan,	with	reference	to	the	country’s	eastern	
and	southern	provinces	inhabited	by	Kurds,	has	been	con-
sistently	opposed	in	order	to	maintain	the	unitary	nature	of	
the	Turkish	Republic.	In	the	present	article,	the	term	Kurdis-
tan	is	used	in	its	broad	sense,	and	does	not	imply	the	region’s	
political	autonomy	or	powers	of	governance.		
1	 Following	the	Ottoman	Empire’s	defeat	 in	World	War	I	 (1918),	 the	division	
of	 its	 land	 (including	 the	 allocation	 of	 areas	 to	 the	 Kurds)	 was	 sealed	
by	the	1923	Treaty	of	Lausanne.
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The	so-called	Kurdish	problem	is	particularly	visible	 in	Turkey.	
This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	Turkey	is	home	to	about	half	of	the	en-
tire	Kurdish	population	(between	a	fifth	and	a	quarter	of	all	Turk-
ish	citizens	are	of	Kurdish	origin2).	The	traditionally	nationalistic	
and	centralised	nature	of	the	Turkish	Republic	makes	this	conflict	
particularly	pronounced,	and	the	possibility	of	a	political	solution	
to	 the	problem	remains	small.	Since	 1984,	nearly	40,000	people	
have	been	killed	in	the	tensions	between	the	Turkish	state	and	the	
Kurdish	minority,	while	the	cost	of	the	unrest	has	been	estimated	
at	no	less	than	$300	billion.	
Until	recently,	 the	Kurdish	problem	had	been	quite	successfully	
contained	by	all	 countries	across	 the	region	 (including	Turkey).	
This	was	possible	due	to	the	countries’	power	and	consistency	in	
their	national	policies	towards	the	Kurds,	as	well	as	thanks	to	ef-
fective	cooperation	between	various	regional	actors	 in	 the	fight	
against	Kurdish	separatism.	Over	the	 last	decade,	however,	and	
especially	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Arab	Spring	(early	2011),	there	
has	been	a	significant	change	in	the	approach	to	the	Kurdish	prob-
lem	across	the	Middle	East.	This	change	has	been	fuelled	primar-
ily	by	a	series	of	crises	and	re-evaluations	in	the	respective	coun-
tries	of	the	region.	These	are	as	follows:	the	overthrow	of	the	Iraqi	
regime	 following	 US	 military	 intervention,	 which	 sparked	 the	
turbulent	disintegration	of	Iraq	(since	2003);	an	civil	war	in	Syr-
ia,	ongoing	since	2011;	a	mounting	crisis	in	Iran	(caused	by	Iran’s	
nuclear	programme	and	Tehran’s	attempts	to	protect	and	extend	
its	influence	across	the	Middle	East);	and	finally,	a	deep	re-eval-
uation	of	goals	in	Turkey’s	domestic	and	regional	policies	follow-
ing	the	takeover	of	power	by	the	Justice	and	Development	Party	
(AKP)	in	2002.	All	this	signals	an	ongoing	and	long-term	shift	in	
the	regional	order,	which	at	this	stage	makes	the	Kurds	not	only	
the	key	object	of	these	changes,	but	is	 increasingly	encouraging	
2	 Estimates	range	between	 11	and	25	million	Kurds,	with	a	 total	population	
of	 Turkey	 at	 nearly	 75	million;	moderate	 estimates	 suggest	 13-19	million.	
For	more,	see	Box	2.
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them	and	transforming	them	into	a	political	player,	especially	in	
Iraq	 and	 Syria,	where	Kurds	 exercise	 real	 control	 over	 densely	
populated	areas.	
Over	 the	past	decade,	 the	Kurdish	 issue	has	also	become	a	 cen-
tre	point	 in	Turkish	politics.	The	AKP’s	policy	 of	 reforming	 the	
country’s	 political	 system	 (including	 a	 shift	 from	 a	 nationalist	
ideology	 centred	 on	 the	 army	 to	 an	 ideology	 developed	 around	
citizenship	and	culture,	particularly	Islamic	culture)	and	a	rise	in	
independent	governance	in	the	Middle	East	has	effectively	turned	
the	Kurdish	people	into	a	significant	political	partner	for	Ankara.	
The	complications	linked	to	the	implementation	of	this	policy	(the	
lack	of	political	 consistency	within	Turkey	and	an	escalation	of	
the	crisis	in	Syria)	have	led	to	an	unexpected	exacerbation	of	the	
Kurdish	 issue	 in	Turkey	and	made	 it	a	key	problem	in	Ankara’s	
Middle	East	policy.	Currently,	it	appears	that	both	Turkey’s	inter-
nal	stability	and	the	direction	of	its	domestic	reforms,	as	well	as	
Turkey’s	future	position	in	the	Middle	East,	will	depend	to	a	great	
extent	on	a	solution	to	the	Kurdish	problem.	
box 2. the Kurds 
The	Kurds	are	an	Iranic	people	(unlike	the	Turks	and	Arabs),	
the	vast	majority	of	whom	are	Sunni	Muslim	(which	distin-
guishes	them	from	Shiite	Persians	and	Azeris	 in	Iran).	Most	
of	the	Kurdish	Sunnis	in	Iraq,	Turkey	and	Iran	belong	to	the	
Shafi’i	 school,	which	distinguishes	 them	 from	Hanafi	Turks	
and	Arabs,	as	well	as	the	new	ultra-conservative	movements	
inspired	by	Wahhabism	and	Salafism.	Others	 adhere	 to	 Im-
mami	 and	 Alevi	 Shiism,	 and	 Yazidism.	 The	 population	 is	
linguistically	 diverse	 (with	 Kurmanji	 and	 Sorani	 being	 two	
main	 dialects),	 and	 shows	 historical	 and	 cultural	 heteroge-
neity	(including	suggestions	that	Zaza	Kurds	and	Yazidis	fall	
outside	the	Kurdish	ethnic	group).	Throughout	the	twentieth	
century	 (and	especially	 in	 the	 last	 few	decades)	 the	Kurdish	
people	have	 been	undergoing	 a	 process	 of	 identity	 building,
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shaped	by	dynamic	migration	(i.e.	internal	migration	to	large	
urban	centres,	especially	 in	Turkey,	and	economic	and	refu-
gee	 migrations	 to	 the	Middle	 East	 and	 the	Western	 world).	 	
There	 are	 no	 reliable	 data	 on	 the	 exact	 number	 of	 Kurds.	
Estimates	place	the	size	of	the	Kurdish	population	at	30-45	mil-
lion,	of	which	13-19	million	live	in	Turkey	(18-25%	of	Turkey’s	
population),	6.5-8	million	in	Iran	(7-10%	of	Iran’s	population),	
about	 6.5	 million	 in	 Iraq	 (15-23%	 of	 Iraq’s	 population),	 and	
1.7-2.2	million	 in	Syria	 (6-9%	of	Syria’s	population).	The	rest	
of	the	Kurds	 live	 in	other	countries	across	the	region	and	in	
Europe	(including	800,000	in	Germany).
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i. Kurds – toWards selF-GoVernance 
At	the	end	of	2012,	the	Kurds	find	themselves	in	the	strongest	po-
sition	they	have	been	in	for	a	century,	that	is,	since	the	collapse	of	
the	Ottoman	Empire	and	the	emergence	of	the	so-called	‘Kurdish	
problem’.	So	far,	despite	their	demographic	power,	a	strong	sense	
of	 distinctiveness	 and	 sustained	 resistance	 to	 the	 centralist	 ac-
tions	of	Turkey,	Iraq,	Iran	and	Syria	(usually	driven	by	nationalist	
sentiments),	the	Kurds	have	remained	politically	weak.	This	was	
caused	by,	among	other	things,	disproportionate	power	relations	
between	the	Kurds	and	the	modern	states	in	the	region,	as	well	as	
regional	cooperation	in	the	fight	against	Kurdish	separatism	(de-
spite	occasional	short-term	tensions),	and	not	least	tensions	and	
serious	conflicts	among	the	Kurds	themselves.	
Currently,	the	Kurds	have	their	own	state	inside	Iraq	(an	autono-
mous	region	of	Kurdistan,	which	remains	a	federal	entity	within	
Iraq	–	see	below).	They	also	control	the	areas	they	inhabit	in	war-
torn	Syria,	and	for	the	last	year	and	a	half	they	have	been	engaged	
in	 armed	 struggle	 against	 Turkey,	 which	 occasionally	 allowed	
them	to	take	full	control	of	their	territory	(at	the	local	level).	
The	rise	in	the	Kurds’	political	capacity	and	aspirations	has	been	
influenced	by	a	series	of	processes	taking	place	within	the	Kurd-
ish	ethnic	group,	namely	their	positive	demographic	trends	(par-
ticularly	 the	 ethnic	 proportions	 in	Turkey,	which	 are	 changing	
in	Kurds’	favour),	as	well	as	continued	modernisation	(including,	
rising	 levels	of	education),	 the	growing	aspirations	of	 the	Kurd-
ish	people,	and	the	maturation	and	strengthening	resolve	of	the	
Kurdish	 elites3.	 Although	 at	 times	 complicated,	 the	 democratic	
3	 The	 two	main	 centres	 of	Kurdish	political	 activity	 are	 the	 elites	 running	
Iraqi	 Kurdistan	 (primarily	 associated	 with	 the	 Barzani	 family)	 and	 the	
Kurdistan	Workers’	Party	(PKK)	together	with	its	associated	organisations	
throughout	Kurdistan.	The	 former	has	experience	of	over	eighty	years	of	
struggle,	and	the	latter	nearly	forty	years.	Both	have	been	engaged	in	large-
scale	social,	organisational,	and	political	activity	(also	internationally).
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and	decentralising	processes	witnessed	in	the	countries	exercis-
ing	sovereignty	over	Kurdistan	have	played	an	important	role	in	
encouraging	the	Kurdish	people.	In	the	case	of	Iraq,	the	US	mili-
tary	 interventions	 in	 1991	 and	 2003	 imposed	 federalisation	 and	
democratisation	on	 the	country;	 in	Turkey,	 the	democratisation	
of	the	nation	was	intensified	under	the	AKP;	while	in	Syria,	the	
changes	have	been	brought	about	by	a	civil	war	launched	on	the	
back	of	the	so-called	Arab	Spring4	and	fought	under	vague	demo-
cratic	slogans	since	2011.		
Kurdistan	 has	 also	 benefited	 from	 recent	 geo-political	 develop-
ments	 in	 the	 region:	 a	 substantially	 weakened	 position	 of	 Iraq	
and	Syria,	problems	in	Iran,	and	difficulties	in	pan-regional	coop-
eration	against	Kurdish	aspirations.	The	Kurds	might	also	benefit	
from	the	gradual	collapse	of	the	existing	regional	order,	especial-
ly	in	the	area	of	national	security.	After	playing	an	instrumental	
role	in	creating	and	solidifying	the	Kurdish	Autonomous	Region	
in	Iraq,	The	United	States	is	pulling	out	of	its	role	as	the	region’s	
policeman,	and	 the	alliance	between	Turkey	and	 Israel,	 seen	as	
a	pillar	of	US	policy	and	a	key	element	stabilising	the	region,	has	
collapsed	5.	Dynamic	changes	are	taking	place	in	the	relations	be-
tween	the	countries	of	the	region6,	while	crises	in	the	individual	
states	 are	 allowing	 radical	 Islamic	 movements	 and	 ethnic	 mi-
norities	to	enter	the	political	arena	as	important	players.	In	view	
of	the	growing	chaos	and	crisis	of	confidence,	the	Kurds	are	in-
creasingly	being	treated	as	a	valuable	tool	in	the	political	games	
played	by	Syria,	Iran	and	Turkey,	among	others.	For	example,	the	
4	 The	 mass-scale	 and	 turbulent	 political	 and	 social	 protests	 that	 swept	
through	all	the	Arab	states	in	2010-2011,	initiating	the	on-going	process	of	
redefining	deep	ideological,	geopolitical	and	political	developments	in	the	
Arab	world	(lasting	achievements	include	the	overthrow	of	the	ruling	re-
gimes	in	Tunisia,	Egypt	and	Libya).
5	 Fighting	 for	a	stronger	position	 in	 the	Arab	world,	 the	AKP	turned	Turkey	
into	a	champion	of	the	Palestinian	cause	and	a	sharp	critic	of	Israel’s	policies.
6	 Examples	include	the	so-called	Sunni-Shiite	conflict,	i.e.,	between	the	Gulf	
States	and	their	allies,	and	Iran,	Syria	and	Iraq;	and	Syria	and	Turkey’s	tran-
sition	from	close	co-operation	to	bitter	conflict.
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chaotic	state	of	affairs	present	in	Iraq	since	2003	has	contributed	
to	 the	 dynamic	 development	 of	 relations	 between	 Ankara	 and	
Erbil	 (the	administrative	capitol	of	 Iraq’s	Kurdish	region)	at	 the	
expense	 of	 previously	 good	 relations	 with	 Baghdad.	 Following	
the	outbreak	of	a	civil	war	in	Syria	in	2011,	Turkey	became	a	vocal	
opponent	of	the	regime	in	Damascus,	which	ended	the	countries’	
cooperation	in	their	fight	against	the	Kurds	(the	so-called	Adana	
agreement	of	1998),	and	drove	a	wedge	between	Turkey	and	Iran,	
which	has	actively	supported	Damascus.	This	has	also	increased	
the	attractiveness	of	the	Kurds	(especially	in	the	case	of	the	Iraqi	
Kurds)	 to	 other	 countries	 interested	 in	 influencing	 geopolitical	
developments	in	the	region	(including	the	US,	Israel,	Russia,	EU	
member	states,	and	Persian	Gulf	states).	The	increased	interest	in	
establishing	dialogue	and	 cooperation	with	 the	Kurds	has	been	
exemplified	by	a	series	of	state	visits,	including	official	visits	by	
the	 head	 of	 Iraqi	 Kurdistan,	Massoud	 Barzani,	 to	Washington,	
Moscow,	Doha	and		several	European	capitals,	as	well	as	the	mush-
rooming	of	foreign	consulates	in	Erbil7.
7	 The	wider	 context	 for	 today’s	 contacts	 had	 been	 created	 through	 several	
decades	of	repeated	involvement	by	Russia	(or	rather	the	former	Soviet	Un-
ion),	 Israel	 and	 the	US,	 leading	 to	 speculation	about	 arms	 supplies	 to	 the	
Kurds,	especially	by	Israel.
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ii. the Main actors on the Kurdish 
political scene 
Currently,	the	Kurds	have	two	main	political	centres:	the	Iraqi	re-
gion	of	Kurdistan	and	the	Kurdistan	Workers’	Party	(PKK).	
The	 former	 is	 a	 real	 Kurdish	 autonomous	 region	 within	 Iraq,	
which	was	created	after	the	first	Gulf	War	(1991),	bolstered	by	the	
2003	American	military	intervention	in	Iraq,	and	enshrined	in	the	
Iraqi	constitution	of	2005	(Kurdistan	is	de	jure	a	part	of	the	Iraqi	
federation;	however,	 it	 is	de facto	a	virtually	 independent	state).	
The	area	was	separated	politically	 from	Iraq,	and	 in	contrast	 to	
Iraq	 proper,	 the	 situation	 in	 Kurdistan	 remains	 stable.	 The	 re-
gion	boasts	a	well-developed	and	functioning	administration,	its	
own	armed	forces	(at	least	100,000	troops,	de	facto	independent	
from	Baghdad);	it	also	pursues	an	independent	foreign	policy	and	
economic	policy8,	which	is	perceived	as	responsible	and	credible	
by	other	states	(including	Turkey)	and	by	energy	companies.	De-
spite	objections	from	Baghdad,	Kurdistan	has	welcomed	foreign	
investors	such	as	Chevron,	Total,	ExxonMobil,	and	GazpromNeft’,	
which	confirms	Erbil’s	credibility	and	can	also	be	seen	as	an	ex-
pression	of	support	for	Kurdistan	from	countries	such	as	the	US	
In	addition,	foreign	investment	provides	long-term	prospects	for	
the	development	of	 an	 Iraqi	Kurdistan	 independent	 from	Bagh-
dad.	The	dominant	position	in	Iraqi	Kurdistan	has	been	tradition-
ally	held	by	the	Barzani	family9;	the	president	of	the	autonomous	
region,	Masoud	Barzani,	hopes	to	position	himself	as	the	leader	of	
the	Kurdish	cause	outside	Iraq10	and	in	the	wider	world.	
8	 One	particular	manifestation	of	this	was	the	development	of	the	energy	sector.
9	 Since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 they	 have	 led	 rebellions	
against	the	Ottomans,	the	British,	and	Iraq.	The	Barzani	fighters	were	the	
army	of	an	ephemeral	and	pro-Soviet	Kurdish	Republic	of	Mahabad	based	
in	Iran	(1945-1946);	after	the	fall	of	the	Republic,	Barzani	was	offered	asy-
lum	in	the	Soviet	Union.	After	returning	to	Iraq	in	1958,	Barzani	once	again	
headed	the	political	and	armed	struggle	for	the	independence	of	Kurdistan.
10	 In	2011-2012	Barzani	led	to	the	unification	of	most	Kurdish	parties	in	Syria	
(resulting,	 in	 2011,	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Kurdish	National	 Council	
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box 3. (autonomous) region of (iraqi) Kurdistan –  
Kurdish regional Government 	
area:	 40	 643	 km2	 [the	 Kurdish	 autonomous	 region	 and	
Baghdad	 have	 so	 far	 failed	 to	 reach	 agreement	 on	 the	 sta-
tus	 of	 Kirkuk	 province	 and	 parts	 of	 Nineveh	 and	 Diyala	
districts,	 all	 of	 which	 remain	 under	 Baghdad’s	 control].	 	
population: 5.2	million	[lack	of	data	on	the	ethnic	make-up	
of	the	region;	alongside	the	strongly	dominant	Kurds,	Kurd-
istan	 is	 inhabited	 by	 Arabs,	 Turkmen,	 Assyrians,	 Yazidis	
and	others]11.
capital: Erbil	(Kurdish:	Hevler).	
	
armed Forces:	 officially	 100,000	 Peshmerga	 troops	 (former	
guerrilla	fighters,	now	characterised	as	a	type	of	national	de-
fence	force	or	interior	troops;	reduced	from	300-400,000	around	
2005);	the	figure	does	not	include	the	Zerevani	(the	militarised	
troops	controlled	by	Kurdistan’s	main	political	parties),	nor	the	
Asayesh	(the	party-controlled	intelligence	agency).	
The	main	political	forces	in	the	KRG	are	the	Kurdistan	Dem-
ocratic	Party	(KDP),	headed	by	Masoud	Barzani	(also	the	re-
gion’s	president)	and	the	Patriotic	Union	of	Kurdistan	(PUK)	
led	 by	 Jalal	 Talabani	 (the	 president	 of	 Iraq).	 The	 PUK	 was	
formed	following	a	split	within	KDP;	for	many	years	the	two	
parties	were	political	rivals,	but	now	they	form	the	pillars	of	
the	 ruling	Kurdistan	List	 coalition).	Kurdish	 Islamic	 groups	
are	seen	as	potential	rivals	to/by	the	current	political	estab-
lishment.	
made	up	of	15	parties)	and	in	Iran	(the	2012	alliance	of	the	Kurdish	Demo-
cratic	Party	of	Iran	and	Komala).	Erbil	has	been	training	and	arming	groups	
of	Syrian	Kurds	linked	to	Kurdish	National	Council.
11	 Source:	Kurdistan	Regional	Government	website	http://www.krg.org/?l=12	
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Selected	 consular	 offices	 and	 chambers	 of	 commerce	 are	 lo-
cated	in	Erbil:	Egypt,	the	United	Kingdom,	France,	Germany,	
Iran,	Jordan,	Palestine,	Russia,	Turkey,	the	USA,	Italy,	Korea,	
Romania,	Sweden,	Greece,	and	the	UAE.	
The	 second	 political	 centre	 is	 the	 Kurdistan	 Workers’	 Party	
(PKK),	a	radical	nationalist	party	espousing	Marxist	ideology.	For	
more	than	30	years	the	PKK	has	been	engaged	in	terrorist/guer-
rilla	warfare	throughout	the	region	now	known	as	Kurdistan.	Its	
strength	lies	in	the	level	of	support	they	receive	from	the	Kurd-
ish	 people	 and	 in	 its	 organisational	 skills,	 as	 evidenced	 by,	 for	
example,	 a	network	of	 local	party	offices	 in	different	 countries,	
and	a	network	of	organisations	throughout	the	Kurdish	diaspora,	
especially	in	the	EU.	The	PKK	also	has	a	very	efficient	army	sta-
tioned	 in	 Iraq’s	 Qandil	Mountains	 (moderate	 estimates	 suggest	
3000-10,000	militants	and	40,000	family	members	and	logistics	
support),	which	is	ready	for	action	in	Turkey,	Syria	and	Iran.	Al-
though	the	PKK	is	regarded	as	a	terrorist	organisation	(for	exam-
ple	by	Turkey,	the	EU	and	the	USA),	in	reality	it	has	been	viewed	
as	a	partner	in	political	negotiations	(including	the	Turkey-PKK	
negotiations	held	in	Oslo	between	2005	and	2011).	At	the	moment,	
the	PKK	is	carrying	out	a	large-scale	guerrilla	war	in	Turkey,	and	
has	 seized	 political	 control	 over	 Syrian	 Kurdistan	 through	 the	
Democratic	Union	Party	 (PYD).	This	 reaffirms	 the	power	of	 the	
PKK,	as	well	as	its	attractiveness	as	a	potential	ally	or	political	tool	
for	Syria	and	Iran.	
box 4. pKK – Kurdistan Workers’ party  
	
Strictly	speaking,	the	PKK	was	an	illegal	Kurdish	nationalist	
and	Marxist	party	founded	in	1978	by	Abdullah	Öcalan	(aka	
Apo),	 which	 was	 engaged	 in	 terrorism	 and	 guerrilla	 war-
fare,	predominantly	against	Turkey	(significantly	increasing	
the	scale	of	its	activity	after	1984),	but	which	also	operated	in	
other	areas	of	Kurdistan.	In	2002,	the	party	became	the	Con-
gress	 for	 Freedom	 and	 Democracy	 in	 Kurdistan	 (KADEK).	 	
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In	a	broader	sense	–	as	used	in	the	present	article	–	the	Kurd-
istan	Workers’	Party	is	a	complex	and	dynamic	network	of	or-
ganisations	operating	as	emanations	of	the	PKK,	evolved	to	re-
flect	the	changing	context.	Formal	authority	over	the	network	
lies	in	the	hands	of	the	Kurdistan	Communities	Union	(KCK;	
founded	around	2005),	which	was	conceived	as	a	platform	for	
civil	and	urban	activity	and	an	umbrella	organisation	for	the	
legislature	 (Kongra	 Gel),	 the	 People’s	 Defence	 Forces	 (HPG),	
and	 the	 judiciary.	 The	 PKK	 has	 been	 dominated	 by	 Turkish	
Kurds,	with	the	Free	Life	Party	of	Kurdistan	(PJAK)	and	the	
Democratic	Union	Party	of	Syria	(PYD)	as	its	local	branches.	
Kurdish	emigrant	organisations	–	especially	in	the	EU	(e.g.	the	
Kurdish	National	Congress	[KNK]),	as	well	as	activists	of	the	
legal	Peace	and	Democracy	Party	(BDP),	operating	in	Turkey	–	
have	been	suspected	of	close	links	with	the	PKK.	
Despite	 its	 complicated	 structure,	 the	 substantial	 autonomy	of	
the	 individual	 organisations	 and	 occasional	 tensions	 and	 con-
flicts,	 the	 PKK	 remains	 a	 coherent	 and	 effective	 force,	 capa-
ble	 of	 organising	 and	 coordinating	 activities	 in	 various	 areas.	
The	PKK	is	currently	headed	by	Murat	Karayilan;	Öcalan’s	au-
thority,	however,	is	still	visible	despite	the	fact	that	the	former	
leader	is	being	held	in	a	Turkish	prison	and	his	contact	with	the	
outside	world	 is	 limited	 to	messages	 sent	 through	his	 lawyers,	
family	members	and	visitors.	
The	PKK’s	 strong	position	 in	Kurdistan	results	 from	 the	party’s	
sizeable,	 professional,	 highly	 ideological	 and	motivated	militia,	
recently	estimated	at	anything	between	3000	and	10,000	fighters.	
The	troops	are	based	in	the	Qandil	Mountains,	northern	Iraq,	at	
the	intersection	of	the	national	borders	of	Iraq,	Iran	and	Turkey.	
Numerous	attempts	at	destroying	their	Qandil	stronghold	(espe-
cially	 by	 Turkish	 forces)	 have	 proved	 ineffective.	 PKK	military	
personnel	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 core	 of	 both	 the	military	 operations	
carried	out	by	the	PKK	against	Turkey,	as	well	as	the	base	of	the	
armed	forces	of	Syria’s	PYD.	
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The	PKK	has	been	designated	a	terrorist	organisation	by	a	num-
ber	of	governments,	 including	the	EU	and	the	US	(however,	 the	
PKK	was	removed	from	Australia’s	list	of	terrorist	organisations	
in	2012	–	a	move	seen	as	a	reaction	both	to	efforts	to	improve	the	
image	of	the	PKK,	as	well	as	a	recognition	of	the	PKK’s	importance	
in	the	region).	
Both	 political	 centres	 are	 competing	 for	 influence,	 but	without	
overlooking	 the	 pragmatic	 importance	 of	 resolving	 the	 current	
tensions,	and	both	hope	to	develop	ways	of	working	together,	es-
pecially	in	Syria12.	It	must	be	noted,	however,	that	neither	the	au-
tonomous	Kurdish	government	in	Iraq	nor	the	PKK	have	decided	
to	keep	up	the	now	controversial	calls	for	Kurdistan’s	independ-
ence:	 In	 Iraq,	 the	 political	 struggle	 between	 Erbil	 and	 Baghdad	
centres	around	the	issue	of	respect	for	the	constitutional	rights	of	
the	Kurdish	minority,	while	in	Turkey	and	Syria	the	PKK	has	been	
officially	demanding	extensive	autonomy.	Nonetheless,	the	PKK’s	
long-term	goal	(often	omitted	for	tactical	reasons)	still	seems	to	be	
an	independent	Kurdish	state.
12	 In	Erbil,	on	11	July	2012,	Barzani	oversaw	the	formal	merger	of	the	Kurdish	
National	Council	and	the	Democratic	Union	Party	(PYD),	the	Syrian	branch	
of	the	PKK,	into	the	Kurdish	Supreme	Council.	Although	the	new	body	has	
not	been	particularly	effective,	 the	merger	of	 the	parties	significantly	re-
duced	tensions	among	Syrian	Kurds.
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iii. the Kurds – challenGes and threats 
Despite	the	impressive	political	achievements	of	the	Kurdish	peo-
ple,	and	favourable	prospects	for	gaining	further	powers,	it	is	un-
likely	that	the	current	state	of	affairs	will	remain	unaltered	for	
long.	 Kurdistan’s	 problems	 are	 linked	 to	 the	 dynamics	 and	 the	
scale	of	the	events	taking	place	in	the	region.	In	Iraq,	the	brew-
ing	 conflict	 between	 the	 political	 leaders	 in	 Erbil	 and	 the	 cen-
tral	government	 in	Baghdad	has	become	more	pronounced;	 this	
is	heightening	 the	prospect	of	 a	military	 confrontation13,	which	
could	potentially	 ruin	 the	current	achievements	of	 the	Kurdish	
leaders.	In	Syria,	a	victory	for	the	opposition	(made	up	of	radical	
Muslims	and	Arabs)	would	doubtless	 start	a	fight	 for	 the	resto-
ration	of	full	control	over	the	areas	currently	in	Kurdish	hands;	
meanwhile,	a	victory	for	the	current	regime	would	increase	ten-
sions	with	Turkey,	depriving	the	Kurds	of	room	for	political	ma-
noeuvre.	 In	Turkey,	 the	spectacular	demonstration	of	 the	PKK’s	
strength	and	determination	 is	unlikely	 to	 translate	 into	 lasting	
political	gains	in	the	near	future.	Despite	significant	progress	to-
wards	the	consolidation	of	the	Kurdish	people,	divisions	and	ten-
sions	between	the	various	Kurdish	ethnic	groups	–	which	other	
countries	of	the	region	have	traditionally	capitalised	on	–	remain	
a	major	problem14.	Although	none	of	the	scenarios	described	ear-
lier	offers	security	to	the	Kurdish	minority,	it	should	be	stressed	
13	 2012	saw	a	number	of	serious	disputes	between	Erbil	and	Baghdad	over	the	
extent	of	their	autonomy	(regarding	political	and	energy	issues)	and	over	
disputed	areas	around	Kirkuk.	Statements	by	President	Barzani	suggested	
secession.	There	were	also	several	serious	incidents	between	Kurdish	forces	
and	the	Iraqi	army	at	the	region’s	borders.
14	 Including	tensions	in	Iraqi	Kurdistan	between	Barzani’s	Kurdistan	Demo-
cratic	Party	and	the	Patriotic	Union	of	Kurdistan	coalition	led	by	Iraq’s	cur-
rent	president,	Jalal	Talabani.	The	latter	is	intent	on	preserving	Iraq’s	integ-
rity	and	is	a	staunch	ally	of	Iran,	which	continues	to	support	Iraq’s	Shiite	
rulers;	radical	Muslim	parties	and	political	societies	have	been	operating	on	
the	fringes	of	the	country’s	political	scene.	In	recent	months,	Syria	has	seen	
a	number	of	violent	outbreaks	between	the	PYD	and	the	KNC.	Tensions	and	
conflicts	are	also	visible	in	the	Turkish	and	Iranian	PKK	(the	Turkish	PKK	
is	believed	to	be	benefiting	from	Iran’s	support,	but	its	local	offshoot,	PJAK,	
has	been	strongly	opposed	by	the	Iranians).	
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that	potential	attempts	to	break	up	any	of	the	Kurdish	‘bastions’	
(i.e.	 their	 autonomous	 region	within	 Iraq,	 the	PKK	bases	 in	 the	
Qandil	Mountains,	or	 the	PYD-controlled	areas	 in	Syria)	would	
certainly	 prove	 very	 challenging	 for	 any	 of	 the	 regional	 states,	
and	would	significantly	contribute	to	a	further,	radical	destabili-
sation	across	the	entire	region.	
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iV. turKeY’s atteMpts to resolVe  
the Kurdish probleM 
When	 the	AKP	 formed	 a	 government	 in	 200215,	 Turkey	 entered	
a	 period	 of	 evolutionary	 but	 radical	 restructuring	 of	 the	 state	
and	a	revision	of	 its	foreign	policy.	Consequently,	the	Kurds	liv-
ing	both	in	Turkey	and	the	neighbouring	countries	have	became	
important	players	in	this	process.	
The	AKP	started	by	effectively	dismantling	the	basis	of	the	Kemal-
ist	republic,	and	has	focused	particularly	on	the	political	standing	
of	the	armed	forces	–	seen	as	a	pillar	of	the	republic,	a	guardian	of	
the	country’s	secular	and	nationalist	character	–	which	until	then	
had	remained	exempt	from	the	democratic	principles	of	the	Turk-
ish	political	scene16.	The	AKP	also	substantially	departed	from	the	
ideology	of	a	nationalist	republic,	in	favour	of	Islam	and	the	con-
cept	of	 fundamental	democratic	values	and	 the	 liberalisation	of	
the	economy.	The	shift	in	Turkey’s	domestic	policy	directly	ben-
efited	the	Kurdish	minority,	among	others.	
Democratic	changes	in	the	country	put	an	end	to	the	domestic	pol-
icies	which	had	ignored	the	existence	of	the	Kurdish	minority,	led	
to	a	gradual	removal	of	anti-Kurdish	laws,	and	saw	unprecedented	
moves	to	condemn	Ankara’s	policy	towards	the	Kurds	in	previous	
decades.	The	 liberalisation	of	policies	 also	permitted	public	use	
of	the	Kurdish	language,	the	launch	of	Kurdish-language	media,	
private	or	elective	Kurdish	language	classes,	the	use	of	Kurdish	in	
prisons,	and	even	plans	to	permit	the	use	of	the	Kurdish	language	
15	 In	subsequent	elections	in	2007	and	2011,	the	AKP	successfully	expanded	its	
electorate,	further	strengthening	its	position	as	Turkey’s	political	hegemon.
16	 Over	a	10-year	period,	the	AKP	managed	to	neutralise	institutional	influence	
on	policy-making	(with	the	help	of	the	Security	Council);	it	also	eliminated	
its	main	political	 opponents,	 and	gained	 influence	over	military	appoint-
ments.	Finally,	 it	 succeeded	 in	discrediting	 the	army’s	political	ambitions	
by	revealing	flagrant	abuses	of	power,	including	provoked	and	staged	acts	
of	terrorism	(the	Ergenekon	trial),	and	attempts	to	escalate	tensions	with	
Greece	in	order	to	carry	out	a coup d’etat	(the	Balyoz	trial).
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by	 local	 government	 officials	 in	 provinces	 inhabited	 by	 Kurds.	
The	 new	 policy	 towards	 the	 Kurdish	minority	 reached	 its	 pin-
nacle	with	the	announcement	of	the	so-called	Democratic	Open-
ing	(2009),	and	earlier	(2005)	by	launching	informal	negotiations	
with	the	PKK17	on	a	possible	amnesty	for	the	militants,	among	oth-
er	questions.	One	of	the	consequences	of	this	new	approach	was	
a	high	level	of	support	for	the	AKP	among	Kurdish	voters.	
Alongside	the	changes	to	Turkey’s	domestic	policies,	the	AKP	gov-
ernment	 also	 significantly	 revised	 the	 country’s	 foreign	 policy,	
especially	with	regard	to	its	relations	with	the	Middle	East	–	a	re-
gion	which	the	Turkish	Republic	had	tended	not	 to	engage	with	
too	closely.	Under	the	AKP,	Turkey	opted	for	a	policy	which	would	
lead	 to	 a	more	 active	 and	 independent	 role	 in	 the	 region,	with	
clear	 ambitions	 to	become	a	political	 leader	 in	 the	Middle	East,	
and	in	the	longer	term,	to	raise	its	status	in	relations	with	the	US,	
NATO	 and	 the	 EU18.	 The	 new	 approach	was	 to	 be	 implemented	
through	greater	openness	to	political	and	economic	ties	with	the	
countries	and	peoples	of	 the	region.	Domestically,	 the	AKP	har-
nessed	 discourses	 of	 civilisational	 ties	 (with	 the	 Islamic	world)	
and	historical	links	(dating	back	to	the	Ottoman	Empire),	which	
has	 led	political	analysts	 to	refer	 to	AKP’s	policies	as	 ‘neo-Otto-
man’.	On	a	regional	scale	(both	for	national	governments	and	the	
Arab	public),	Turkey	has	aspired	to	become	a	role	model	for	mod-
ernisation	and	domestic	transformation,	as	well	as	a	mediator	in	
relations	with	the	West	(especially	with	regard	to	tensions	with	
Iran)	 and	 an	 arbitrator	 in	 regional	 disputes	 (especially,	 in	 the	
Palestinian-Israeli	conflict).	
17	 The	expressions	‘PKK’	and	‘KCK’	are	used	interchangeably	by	both	the	Turk-
ish	media	and	in	Kurdish-published	materials.
18	 This	includes	efforts	to	take	over	as	a	representative	of	Western	political	in-
terests	in	the	region,	and	the	rather	successful	attempts	to	be	seen	as	a	stra-
tegic	partner,	rather	than	a	passive	actor,	in	the	EU’s	Southern	Gas	Corridor	
from	the	Caspian	Sea	and	the	Middle	East	to	Europe.
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Turkey’s	new	policy	towards	the	region	accelerated	the	disman-
tling	 of	 the	 current	 system,	which	had	 guaranteed	 the	 region’s	
precarious	 stability.	 By	 doing	 so,	 Ankara	 distanced	 itself	 from	
the	 US	 and	 effectively	 ended	 its	 alliance	with	 Israel	 (following	
a	serious	crisis	of	confidence	between	the	parties	and	persistent	
political	 tensions	 in	 bilateral	 relations,	 leading	 to	 a	 breakdown	
in	military	cooperation).	On	the	other	hand,	Turkey	established	
closer	 ties	with	Syria	and	 Iran,	 and	began	 to	work	closely	with	
non-state	actors,	 such	as	 the	Kurds,	Hamas,	and	 later	also	with	
Syria’s	armed	opposition	forces19.	The	Arab	Spring,	and	especially	
the	outbreak	of	civil	war	in	Syria	(2011),	led	to	a	further	destabi-
lisation	of	 the	 region	and	altered	Ankara’s	 relations	with	 states	
across	 the	Middle	East	 (for	example,	open	hostility	 towards	 the	
authorities	in	Damascus,	and	deep	crisis	in	relations	with	Tehran	
and	Baghdad).	
The	radical	nature	of	the	changes	and	the	strength	of	Turkey’s	in-
fluence	in	the	Middle	East	can	be	seen	most	clearly	in	Ankara’s	re-
lations	with	Iraqi	Kurdistan.	After	decades	of	consistent	opposi-
tion	to	even	the	slightest	signs	of	separatist	ambitions	among	the	
Kurds,	in	2007	–	that	is,	after	officially	freezing	all	relations	be-
tween	Erbil	and	the	PKK	forces	based	in	the	Qandil	Mountains20	–	
Turkey	established	close	political	and	economic	cooperation	with	
Iraqi	Kurdistan.	Kurdistan	(subsumed	under	Iraq	in	trade	statis-
tics)	has	become	 the	 leading	market	 for	Turkish	goods	 (a	 sharp	
rise	from	$2.8	billion	in	2007	to	$8.2	billion	in	2011	made	Iraq	the	
second	 biggest	 importer	 of	 Turkish	 goods,	 after	 Germany).	 The	
same	was	 true	 for	 services	 and	 investment,	 especially	 in	 infra-
structure	projects	and	the	oil	and	gas	sector.	Energy	cooperation	
19	 After	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 to	 mediate	 between	 the	 government	 in	 Da-
mascus	and	 the	opposition	 in	 the	first	months	of	protests	 in	2011.	Turkey	
offered	refuge	and	support	to	the	political	and	armed	Syrian	opposition,	and	
remained	its	main	benefactor	at	least	until	the	summer	of	2012.
20	 Until	2006,	Turkey	had	no	political	relations	with	the	Kurdish	autonomous	
region.	The	dynamic	cooperation	between	Kurdistan	and	Turkey	coincided	
with	the	2007	appointment	of	Ahmet	Davutoğlu	as	Foreign	Affairs	Minister	
(the	architect	of	the	neo-Ottoman	politics).
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with	Kurdistan	will,	in	principle	at	least,	allow	Ankara	to	diver-
sify	 its	oil	 imports	 (and	 in	 future,	 also	 its	natural	gas	 imports).	
It	also	bolsters	Turkey’s	ambitions	to	become	a	strategic	interme-
diary	for	energy	imports	to	the	EU.	At	the	same	time,	Kurdistan’s	
cooperation	with	Turkey	significantly	strengthens	its	position	in	
the	brewing	 conflict	between	Erbil	 and	Baghdad.	This	 is	due	 to	
two	 factors:	 first,	 the	 region’s	 growing	 economic	 independence	
and	 the	possibility	of	 economic	development	without	Baghdad’s	
help,	and	second,	the	possibility	that	Ankara	might	become	Erbil’s	
political	protector	(an	unprecedented	development).	The	benefits	
of	establishing	close	ties	with	Kurdistan	have	cost	Turkey	its	pre-
viously	good	relations	with	Baghdad,	and	with	the	growing	threat	
of	an	armed	conflict	between	 Iraqi	Kurdistan	and	 Iraq’s	central	
government,	Ankara	has	implied	that	it	may	have	no	choice	but	to	
side	with	Kurdistan	in	the	event	of	hostilities.	It	therefore	follows	
that	Iraqi	Kurdistan	has	become	the	most	spectacular	and	tangi-
ble	 embodiment	 of	 Turkey’s	 new	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 policies:	
that	is,	a	clear	break	with	its	previous	policy	paradigm	towards	
the	Kurds	and	the	neighbouring	states;	the	projection	of	economic	
interests,	 resulting	 in	 a	 significant	 expansion	 of	 political	 influ-
ence;	and	a	tangible	attempt	to	revise	the	existing	regional	order	
with	a	view	to	increasing	Turkey’s	influence.
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V. the crisis oF turKeY’s policY toWards 
the Kurds – neW challenGes 
Problems	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 Ankara’s	 new	 policy	 to-
wards	 the	Kurds	began	 to	appear	as	early	as	2009,	 and	became	
fully	 visible	 in	 2011	 and	 2012.	 The	 liberalisation	 policy	 towards	
the	Kurds,	and	especially	the	launch	of	the	Democratic	Opening	
programme	in	2009,	encouraged	further	demands	by	the	Kurds	
and	led	to	a	rather	triumphalist	mood21,	which	precipitated	a	re-
turn	to	a	carrot-and-stick	policy	by	Ankara.	This	sparked	a	wave	
of	arrests	of	Kurdish	activists	suspected	of	having	ties	to	the	PKK/
KCK;	around	8,000	people	were	arrested.	(At	the	same	time,	how-
ever,	 the	government	continued	 its	efforts	 to	 increase	 the	pres-
ence	of	the	Kurdish	language	in	the	public	sphere,	including	the	
media	and	the	education	sector).	The	tensions	were	exacerbated	
by	parliamentary	elections	in	June	2011,	seen	by	both	sides	as	a	test	
of	 their	 real	 intentions.	 There	was	 clear	 frustration	 among	 the	
Kurds	when	the	main	Kurdish	party	and	the	AKP’s	main	political	
rival	in	south-east	Turkey	–	the	Peace	and	Democracy	Party	(BDP)	
–	was	forced	to	run	in	the	elections	after	having	been	significantly	
weakened	by	earlier	arrests.	Some	BDP	MPs	who	won	their	ballots	
were	unable	to	claim	their	seats	and	were	subsequently	arrested.	
All	this	has	translated	into	growing	support	for	PKK’s	armed	ac-
tivity	(which	had	been	increasing	since	the	spring	of	2011).	
Contrary	 to	Ankara’s	hopes	 for	 a	 complete	disintegration	of	 the	
PKK	–	signs	of	which	had	been	noticed	in	the	previous	decade22	–	
the	organisation	has	once	again	shown	that	it	continues	to	wield	
serious	military	power	(including	increasingly	modern	weapons,	
21	 Exemplified	by	large-scale	celebrations	held	on	24	October	2009	in	honour	
of	PKK	militants	returning	to	Turkey,	which	caused	extreme	irritation	in	
Ankara.
22	 Exemplified	by	the	arrest	of	PKK	leader,	Abdullah	Öcalan,	his	subsequent	
commitment	to	a	political	solution	to	the	Kurdish	problem,	and	the	strong	
support	of	the	Kurdish	people	for	the	AKP	(back	in	2011,	up	to	half	the	Kurd-
ish	electorate	had	voted	for	the	ruling	party).
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training	methods	and	combat	tactics)	coupled	with	broad	public	
support.	For	over	a	year,	the	PKK	has	not	only	survived	repeated	
attacks	by	Turkish	forces,	but	has	effectively	mounted	offensives	
against	 government	 troops,	 periodically	 taking	 control	 of	 areas	
and	roads	in	south-east	Turkey.	It	has	also	carried	out	bombings	
outside	the	areas	traditionally	inhabited	by	Kurds.	Since	the	sum-
mer	of	2011,	nearly	a	thousand	people	(soldiers,	civilians	and	PKK	
fighters)	have	been	killed	in	the	hostilities.	
The	government	in	Ankara	has	also	been	surprised	by	unexpect-
edly	high	public	 support	 for	 the	PKK,	and	by	 the	party’s	ability	
to	capitalise	on	this	development.	These	anti-government	senti-
ments	have	been	fuelled	particularly	by	the	arrests	of	local	activ-
ists	with	ties	to	the	PKK,	and	the	violent	consequences	of	a	large-
scale	military	operation	against	PKK	insurgents.	This	in	turn	has	
helped	swell	the	ranks	of	the	PKK	fighters	based	in	the	mountains,	
and	cemented	social	resentment	against	the	state	apparatus.	On	
the	other	hand,	the	scale	of	the	crisis	suggests	penetration,	or	at	
least	great	mutual	affinity,	between	BDP	and	PKK/KCK	activists	–	
it	can	be	safely	assumed	that	much	of	the	charges	brought	against	
BDP	activists	had	been	based	on	solid	evidence;	after	all,	BDP	mem-
bers	had	often	publicly	voiced	their	support	for	the	PKK/KCK.	The	
chances	that	the	government	will	see	the	BDP	as	a	potential	politi-
cal	partner	have	therefore	fallen	sharply,	while	the	likelihood	of	
the	BDP	being	used	by	the	PKK	have	markedly	increased.	One	of	
the	most	spectacular	manifestations	of	the	PKK’s	ability	to	mobi-
lise	the	Kurds	was	a	hunger	strike	staged	in	October	and	Novem-
ber	 2012	 by	 groups	 of	Kurds	 held	 in	Turkish	 prisons	 (involving	
several	 hundred	 people	 altogether):	 the	 inmates	 demanded	 the	
right	to	speak	Kurdish	during	court	proceedings	and	called	on	the	
government	 to	allow	Öcalan	access	 to	his	 lawyers	 (he	had	been	
denied	this	right	since	2011).	The	incident	was	widely	publicised	
in	the	Western	media,	which	led	to	an	intervention	by	the	Euro-
pean	Commission,	and	consequently	 to	concessions	by	 the	state	
(although	the	government	announced	both	changes	regardless	of	
the	 strike,	 the	final	outcome	was	 interpreted	as	a	 clear	win	 for	
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the	Kurds).	The	military	and	political	power	of	the	PKK,	as	dem-
onstrated	last	year,	has	seriously	complicated	the	implementation	
of	Ankara’s	liberalised	approach	towards	the	Kurds	–	it	opens	up	
the	government	to	allegations	that	their	policies	have	been	inef-
fective,	it	stalls	them,	and	takes	away	the	government’s	initiative	
in	implementing	them.	
However,	the	circumstance	which	poses	the	most	serious	threat	
to	 Ankara’s	 new	 approach	 towards	 the	 Kurdish	 problem	 (and	
more	broadly,	to	its	entire	Middle	East	policy)	is	the	ongoing	civil	
war	in	Syria,	which	began	in	the	spring	of	2011	and	appears	far	
from	over.	The	war	is	particularly	significant	for	Ankara	because	
Turkey	had	(indirectly)	sided	with	the	Syrian	opposition23;	this	re-
sulted	in	a	political	conflict	between	the	Turkish	government	and	
the	regime	in	Damascus,	and	by	extension	the	regime’s	support-
ers	in	Tehran.	From	Ankara’s	perspective,	the	negative	influence	
the	Syrian	conflict	has	had	on	the	Turkish	Kurds	is	not	so	much	
an	intensification	of	Turkey’s	pre-existing	internal	problem	as	it	
is	the	main	cause	of	the	problem,	and	therefore	a	strategic	chal-
lenge	for	the	government.	Turkey	believes	–	not	without	good	rea-
son	–	that	the	renewed	PKK	activity	in	Turkey	is	directly	linked	
to	the	Syrian	crisis.	It	also	suspects	that	the	actions	between	the	
Syrian	and	Turkish	PKK	fighters	are	coordinated,	and	the	escala-
tion	of	tensions	has	been	fuelled	by	the	support	the	PKK	has	re-
ceived	from	Syria	and	Iran.	The	assumption	that	the	actions	of	the	
PKK	and	PYD	are	being	coordinated	is	supported	by	the	fact	that	
both	organisations	operate	under	a	de	facto	single	group	of	lead-
ers,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	the	sizeable	armed	forces	of	the	Turk-
ish	and	Syrian	Kurds	are	partly	made	up	of	professional	 troops	
permanently	located	in	Iraq’s	Qandil	Mountains	(for	example,	the	
bulk	of	 the	PYD	 forces	 is	made	up	of	 a	 2,000-strong	contingent	
sent	from	the	Qandils	to	Syria	in	the	spring	of	2012).	In	addition,	
23	 In	spring	2011,	Turkey	offered	refuge	and	support	to	the	Syrian	political	op-
position	(a	political	base	for	the	future	Syrian	National	Council);	since	the	
summer	of	2011	Turkey	has	protected	and	supported	groups	of	 the	armed	
opposition	(Free	Syrian	Army).
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Turkish	analyses	have	shown	that	about	30%	of	the	PKK	militants	
killed	in	Turkey	were	of	Syrian	origin24.	There	is	also	some	evi-
dence	 that	 the	 PKK	has	 been	 receiving	 support	 from	Syria	 and	
Iran:	for	instance,	the	obvious	and	acute	conflict	of	interests25;	an	
amnesty	for	PKK	militants	granted	by	Syria	at	the	beginning	of	
the	conflict	(for	example,	PYD	leader	Salih	Muslim	Muhammad	
had	already	returned	to	Syria	from	the	Qandils	in	2011);	the	with-
drawal	of	Syrian	troops	from	the	areas	inhabited	by	the	Kurds	(by	
July	2012);	reports	about	Iran’s	decision	to	make	its	bases	on	the	
Iranian-Turkish	border	available	to	the	PKK26;	and	finally,	the	re-
ports	about	 the	expansion	and	 increased	activity	of	 the	 Iranian	
spy	network	in	the	Turkish	Kurdistan	(one	of	the	spy	rings	was	
uncovered	 in	 late	 August/early	 September	 2012).	 Viewed	 from	
this	perspective,	the	rise	of	PKK	activity	in	Turkey	in	2011	would	
betray	the	PKK’s	real	intentions	towards	the	allies,	and	the	effec-
tive	 ‘autonomy’	 for	 the	Syrian	Kurds,	granted	 in	 the	summer	of	
2012,	could	be	seen	as	a	reward	for	their	cooperation.	
With	all	the	ambiguities	associated	with	the	anti-Turkish	activi-
ties	of	the	PKK,	the	fact	remains	that	the	PKK/KCK	holds	sufficient	
political,	social	and	military	influence	inside	Turkey	to	be	recog-
nised	as	a	serious,	endemic	power.	At	the	same	time,	the	key	fac-
tors	which	increase	the	PKK’s	political	and	military	capacity	and	
provides	it	with	strong	support	are	its	base	in	the	Qandil	Moun-
tains,	and	especially	the	new	political	achievements	in	Syria	and	
the	alleged	backing	from	Syria	and	Iran.	The	Syrian	Kurds’	infor-
mal	autonomy	has	been	getting	stronger,	the	PKK’s	freedom	to	act	
24	 In	part	this	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that	a	large	group	of	Syrian	Kurds	is	made	
up	of	Kurdish	 refugees	 and	 their	 children	 from	Turkey,	who	 relocated	 to	
Turkey	in	the	1980s.
25	 Turkey’s	support	for	the	Syrian	opposition	has	inevitably	led	to	a	conflict	of	
interests	between	Ankara,	Damascus	and	Tehran.	Evidence	for	this	argu-
ment	can	be	found	in	the	quite	open	threats	made	against	Turkey	by	Iran’s	
chief	of	staff,	referring	to	the	consequences	of	Turkey’s	support	for	the	Syr-
ian	opposition.
26	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 bases	 in	 the	 Qandil	Mountains,	 these	 bases	 cannot	 be	
bombed	with	impunity	by	the	Turkish	air	force.
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continues	to	 increase,	and	the	elimination	of	autonomy	appears	
to	be	currently	out	of	reach	either	for	the	Syrian	opposition	or	the	
government	 in	Damascus	 (nor	does	 it	 appear	 to	be	among	 their	
immediate	priorities).	Nor	 is	 it	 likely	 that	Turkey	would	be	able	
to	contain	the	Syrian	Kurds	by	military	means.	Due	to	 the	cur-
rently	strained	relations	between	Turkey	&	the	PKK,	and	Damas-
cus	&	Tehran,	the	only	actors	capable	of	somewhat	limiting	PKK	
operations	in	Syria	are	either	the	Kurdish	autonomous	region	in	
Iraq	(specifically,	the	Kurdish	National	Congress	in	Syria	backed	
by	Barzani,	which	nonetheless	remains	unable	to	offset	the	PYD’s	
influence)	or	the	Syrian	opposition27.	Currently,	the	PKK’s	unmis-
takable	 sense	 of	 power,	 Ankara’s	 rejection	 of	 this	 fact,	 and	 the	
mutual	 distrust	 and	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 recent	 developments	
render	 the	 chances	 for	 a	 resumption	 of	 a	 political	 dialogue	 be-
tween	Turkey	and	the	PKK	rather	remote	(in	both	the	Turkish	and	
the	Syrian	contexts).
27	 Syrian	 opposition	 forces	 strongly	 oppose	 the	 Kurdish	 calls	 for	 autonomy	
or	 federalism;	 Turkey’s	 direct	 influence	 over	 the	 opposition	 has	 also	 di-
minished	 (at	 a	meeting	 in	Doha	 in	November,	 the	Turkish-backed	Syrian	
National	Council	was	replaced	by	the	Syrian	National	Coalition,	whose	ori-
gin	and	composition	more	closely	reflects	both	the	real	balance	of	forces	in	
Syria	and	the	interests	of	the	Gulf	states).
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Vi. the Kurdish issue – the outlooK For 
turKeY 
Turkey’s	policy	towards	the	Kurdish	minority	has	reached	an	im-
passe.	The	Kurds	are	becoming	an	ever	more	powerful	and	inde-
pendent	political	player	against	the	background	of	the	deepening	
political	crisis	in	the	Middle	East	(in	Syria,	Iraq,	and	potentially	
in	Iran).	If	the	dynamics	of	the	recent	developments	in	the	region	
continue,	the	formation	of	a	Kurdish	state	in	the	coming	years	is	
no	 longer	 just	a	pipe	dream,	particularly	as	 the	capacity	 to	stop	
this	process	by	force	is	diminishing.		
For	Turkey,	the	key	objectives	at	the	moment	are	the	pacification	
of	the	PKK	within	its	borders,	followed	by	a	political	solution	to	the	
problem.	 Considering	 the	 armed	 offensive	 launched	 by	 the	 PKK	
and	Ankara’s	military	response,	the	chances	for	a	political	dialogue	
have	greatly	diminished	–	partly	because	any	concessions	made	by	
the	government	at	this	stage	would	be	seen	as	loss	of	prestige	and	
a	political	defeat.	The	chances	for	a	compromise	are	also	not	helped	
by	regional	dynamics	 (especially	 in	Syria).	The	matter	 is	 further	
complicated	by	the	political	calendar	shaping	AKP’s	priorities:	the	
AKP	is	seeking	speedy	changes	to	the	constitution,	and	is	getting	
ready	for	local	government	and	presidential	elections	in	2014.	This	
is	forcing	the	AKP	to	seek	allies	on	the	Turkish	political	scene	(al-
though	in	practice	the	AKP	is	interested	in	the	extreme	national-
ist	and	anti-Kurdish	Nationalist	Movement	Party	[MHP]),	as	well	
as	the	votes	of	the	conservative	parts	of	the	electorate	–	the	Kurds’	
main	political	 forces,	 the	BDP	 and	PKK/KCK,	 are	 opposed	 to	 the	
AKP.	 In	 the	 current	political	 context,	 a	 repeat	 of	 the	Democratic	
Opening	 to	 the	Kurds	 is	 rather	unlikely,	 although	 it	 is	 clear	 that	
such	a	policy	could	distract	 the	Kurdish	minority	away	from	the	
PKK.	This	approach	could	also	be	reintroduced	during	future	work	
on	 the	 constitution.	 It	 can	be	 assumed	 that	Ankara	 could	obtain	
more	room	for	manoeuvre	on	the	Kurdish	issue	if	the	position	of	
the	AKP	were	to	be	strengthened	further	following	future	elections	
and	changes	to	the	country’s	constitution.
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Turkey’s	policy	on	Iraq	and	the	local	Kurds	has	also	reached	a	dif-
ficult	point.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Kurdish	autonomous	region	in	
Iraq	has	 come	under	Turkey’s	 political	 and	 economic	 influence,	
and	 elevated	Ankara	 to	 the	position	 of	 Erbil’s	 protector	 against	
Baghdad.	On	the	other	hand,	Turkey	is	becoming	hostage	to	Erbil’s	
policy	towards	Iraq	and	its	policy	towards	the	Syrian	Kurds	and	
the	PKK;	 in	 effect,	 the	 region	 currently	offers	 the	only	 solution	
to	counterbalance	PKK’s	influence	and	the	only	way	to	influence	
the	Kurdish	minority	from	within.	In	Iraq,	the	conflict	between	
the	Kurdish	autonomous	region	and	Baghdad	has	been	becoming	
increasingly	serious	for	at	least	a	year,	and	could	escalate	to	civil	
war.	This,	however,	would	mean	a	more	or	less	open	confrontation	
between	Turkey	and	Iraq	(and	indirectly	also	with	Iran)	in	the	not	
too	distant	future.	Consequently,	the	fate	of	the	Kurdish	autono-
mous	region	will	be	a	significant	determinant	of	Turkey’s	future	
position	in	the	Middle	East	and	in	relation	to	the	local	Kurds.	
A	serious	and	long-term	threat	to	the	stability	of	the	region	will	
continue	to	come	from	Syria	and	the	local	Kurdish	minority,	who	
are	currently	enjoying	real	political	independence.	This	fact	can-
not	be	ignored	regardless	of	which	side	wins	the	current	conflict.	
If,	following	the	civil	war,	Syria	remains	in	the	hands	of	the	old	
regime,	and	if	the	regime	accepts	and	formalises	the	Kurdish	au-
tonomous	region,	that	region	will	 likely	have	an	explicitly	anti-
Turkish	character.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	conflict	is	won	by	the	
opposition,	 formal	autonomy	for	the	Syrian	Kurds	seems	rather	
unlikely	(with	the	exception	of	perhaps	a	temporary	agreement).	
Such	a	scenario	would	lead	to	a	military	confrontation	in	Syria,	
resulting	in	a	serious	armed	conflict	on	Turkey’s	border,	with	all	
the	consequences	of	such	a	development	(at	least	in	the	area	of	soft	
security,	such	as	a	mass	influx	of	refugees);	alternatively,	it	would	
lead	to	 the	strengthening	of	 the	 independence	of	PKK’s	pseudo-
state.	So	 far,	 the	 instruments	Ankara	has	used	 to	 influence	 the	
situation	in	Syria	have	failed	to	reflect	the	seriousness	of	the	risks	
the	conflict	could	pose	to	Turkey.	Ankara’s	involvement	through	
either	the	Syrian	opposition	or	the	Iraqi	Kurds	would	have	at	most	
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an	 indirect	 effect	 on	 the	war,	 and	would	not	help	 it	 resolve	 the	
conflict	in	a	way	that	the	Turkish	government	would	desire.	In	the	
long	run,	an	Iraq-style	solution	in	Syria	would	be	more	favourable	
to	Turkey:	namely,	the	overthrow	of	the	regime	and	a	long-term,	
but	not	necessarily	formal,	division	of	the	country.	As	in	the	case	
of	 Iraqi	Kurdistan,	 this	 outcome	would	 force	 the	Kurds	 to	 seek	
a	solution	by	engaging	with	Turkey,	and	give	Turkey	far	more	bar-
gaining	power.	However,	this	is	just	one	of	many	equally	plausible	
scenarios.	
Taking	the	above	into	account,	one	could	speak	of	a	serious	crisis	
in	AKP’s	 ‘neo-Ottoman’	policies	towards	the	Kurds:	the	problem	
has	been	exacerbated	by	both	domestic	and	international	devel-
opments,	and	opened	new	areas	of	potential	 conflict	 for	Turkey	
–	contrary	to	its	intentions	and	capabilities.	
On	the	other	hand	–	unlike	in	past	decades	–	the	situation	in	the	
region	has	been	very	dynamic,	and	the	power	struggles	and	crises	
occurring	in	the	respective	countries	have	been	widespread	and	
long-lasting,	affecting	the	region’s	geopolitical	order.	It	is	unlikely	
that	the	situation	will	stabilise	in	the	short	term;	it	is	also	impossi-
ble	to	expect	a	return	to	the	state	of	affairs	of	2010,	let	alone	2002.	
Compared	to	the	rest	of	the	region,	Turkey	is	not	only	the	strong-
est	and	most	stable	state,	but	is	also	a	nation	that	has	started	its	
own	internal	reforms	and	initiated	a	shift	in	the	region’s	geopo-
litical	order.	This	gives	reason	to	believe	that	the	current	crisis	is	
likely	to	leave	it	even	stronger.	Without	a	doubt,	the	Kurdish	issue	
remains	a	fundamental	pillar	of	Turkey’s	Middle	East	policy,	and	
an	important	element	of	its	domestic	policy;	in	this	case,	however,	
there	are	no	fast	or	easy	solutions.
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